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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we study the relationship between legislature size with respect to general government and welfare 
spending. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because 
logrolling and transaction costs have canceling effects. Bicameralism is expected to have a negative effect 
because of the increased transaction cost of finding a viable majority in two houses with different 
constituencies. We use a cross-section of 75 countries over the period 1990-1998 controlling for some 
institutional features that differ among countries. We find that both legislature size and bicameralism do not 
have a significant effect on the two types of spending.  
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I. Introduction 
According to the interest-group theory of government, in legislatures politicians act 
as brokers among to various groups in the economy by supplying different pieces of 
legislation. Lobbyists play an important role in this trading by creating issues, contacting 
politicians, making possible cross-voting between several laws and interests. The interest-
group theory of government assumes that the vast majority of governmental activities 
involve transfers of resources among citizens. Some of them will ultimately result as net 
winners in this process, others will be net losers. This circumstance is based upon the fact 
that information is dispersed among interest-groups, politicians, and lobbyists, and 
exchanging information implies transaction costs. No Pareto-inferior policy will be adopted 
where a unanimity rule controls political decisions, and voting is costless. Moving away 
from this idealized world, wealth-transfer decisions become central: majority rule will raise 
their amount because it lowers the costs of influencing collective decisions. At the same 
time, the cost of information is twofold: on the one hand each decision maker has to uncover 
the effects of an issue on his personal wealth, on the other hand he has to identify other 
decision makers that will join him on the issue. Of course winners and losers change from 
issue to issue under the constraint of finding a majority in committees and in chamber(s).1 
Legislatures resolve the conflict between different issues acting as place “to clear the market 
for wealth transfers” (Shughart and Tollison, 1986). 
Previous studies have concentrated on the US States because of the homogeneity of 
the institutions and their rules, with the only exception of Bradbury and Crain (2001) who 
consider a panel of 34 countries. In this paper we extend previous literature in a number of 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper we interchangeably use the words house, lower house and lower chamber on the one 
hand, and senate, upper house and upper chamber on the other hand.  
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directions. First, we control for some features that characterize different forms of 
government, namely presidential/parliamentarian systems and electoral rules. Second, we 
extend this analysis to a cross-section of 75 democracies for the period 1990-1998. Finally, 
we also apply this empirical apparatus to constituency size. In doing so we link this literature 
on interest groups that has sprung in the ‘70s and the ‘80s with recent work in comparative 
politics as surveyed by Persson and Tabellini (2000 and 2003). 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the theory and the empirics 
of bicameralism and legislature size and its relationship with government spending. Section 
3 presents the relationships and the variables, while Section 4 presents the relevant results. 
Section 5 concludes. An Appendix gives details on data.   
 
II. The theoretical and empirical literature 
Legislature size 
Stigler (1979) models state legislatures as responsive to desires of different group 
interests. Representatives are chosen by these groups on the basis of the value that the group 
assigns to the particular policy in which they are interested. These values are obtained by 
summing and discounting the net benefits of any particular action over the people that may 
potentially benefit. These valuations have a probability density equal to f(Vj) = e-v. Usually 
many of these evaluations are almost zero, while a few have a large value. These interests 
are those that select representatives. These evaluations are perceived as demand for 
legislation. However, this does not imply that each interest group has its own 
representatives: some groups with similar interests may share some representatives and the 
distribution of values may be such that the organization costs to a group of voters will 
exceed the discounted present value of representation. Therefore, these groups do not find it 
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efficient to seek representation. Stigler assumes that legislative size – for both houses - is a 
function of population, the rate of change in population, and population density.2 The 
expectations are that larger populations lead to more demand for legislators, while larger 
rates of change and higher population density involve smaller legislatures. These variables 
are statistically significant with exception of population density for two cross-section 
samples: 49 US States and 52 countries. 
 McCormick and Tollison (1981) formalize the problem of an interest group that 
decides how much to spend on buying legislative influence, and its agent (lobby) must 
decide how to allocate this budget (E) across the two houses of the legislature to maximize 
the organization’s return from legislative influence. The organization knows that the votes 
(V) it will receive in the two houses are function of its expenditure in each house (Eh and Es), 
and the size of each house (h and s), therefore: Vh = Vh(Eh, h) and Vs = Vs(Es, s). The problem 
faced by the interest group is to maximize the net returns from legislative influence Yn = Y – 
E subject to E = Eh + Es, Y = Y(Vh, Vs, L, W, P), and the previous vote functions, where W is 
wealth of the community, P is population, and L is legislative size.3 Larger legislature size 
(defined as the sum of lower and upper house) has an indefinite effect on government 
spending. On the one hand, an increase in the number of legislators results in a lower cost of 
lobbying because of additional competition between vote suppliers. Furthermore, when the 
total number of legislators increases, there are potential gains from increased specialization 
of labor in the committee apparatus. On the other hand, as long as the number of legislators 
increases, the transaction costs needed to find a viable majority of votes are also increased. 
Eventually, the problem is an empirical one. 
                                                 
2 There is also a dummy variable for New England, which has an exceptionally large legislature. 
3 For a detailed account of this model, McCormick and Tollison (1981, ch. 4). 
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Weingast et al. (1981) provide a formal model on the size of legislatures, in which 
they consider each chamber in itself, not the overall number of legislators. Let bi(x) be the 
benefit of spending x dollars in district i to the constituents of legislator i, and let c(x) be the 
cost of spending. The efficient level of spending is such that b’i(x) = c’(x). If there are n 
districts and taxes are spread evenly across districts, the legislator i bear (1/n)th of the cost of 
spending in district i. Therefore, legislator i pushes x up to the point in which b’i(x) = 
(1/n)c’(x). This implies that the optimal level of spending for each legislator is increasing in 
n. If legislators logroll and defer to each other regarding such expenditure, then the total 
spending is increasing in n. This implication is called “the Law of 1/n”. 
Using a cross section of US states for a given year, McCormick and Tollison (1981) 
find considerable support for the implications of their theory with respect to three issues that 
are relevant to lobbies’ activity: the degree of economic regulation, the degree of 
occupational regulation, and bills enacted. Crain (1979) estimates a production function for 
the output of the legislative firm. Although he finds evidence that some variables (i.e., length 
of the legislative session, majority proportions of the legislature, and bill introduced), he 
does not find any relationship between legislature size and bills introduced, and to find a 
significant relationship with bicameralism he has to apply an exponential transformation to 
this variable. Shughart and Tollison (1986) find a positive relationship between real per-
capita government spending and the number of public and private bills enacted into law. 
They show that these results hold in the long-run, using data for legislature and laws ranging 
from 1889 to 1980. Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) find that, after controlling for constituent 
interests, the number of seats in the upper house is positively associated with per-capita state 
and local direct general expenditure. Furthermore, a large legislature leads to higher 
spending in both capital and non-capital programs, welfare, education and highway 
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expenditures. Possibly, these results do not extend to lower chamber because bicameralism is 
not taken into account as an explanatory variable. These results are viewed as a confirmation 
of “the Law of 1/n”.4  
Bradbury and Crain (2001) analyze a panel of 24 bicameral countries and 14 
unicameral countries for the period 1971-1989. They include four control variables: log of 
population, population growth, log of real per-capita GDP, and openness. Results show that 
the size of the lower chamber is positively related to government expenditure, while the size 
of the upper chamber is negatively related to spending. The latter point estimate is much 
smaller in absolute value than the former. We depart from this study by considering a much 
wider sample of countries in pure cross-section. Indeed, the size and the structure of 
legislative bodies reveal a very low variability, which forces us to be cautious about the use 
of data with a time dimension. More important, we point out that countries differ from a 
range of institutional features that needs to be controlled for to make meaningful cross-
country comparisons. We control for the form of government (presidential/parliamentarian), 
electoral rules (majoritarian/proportional, closed/open lists). Finally, we consider central 
government expenditure as a measure of the size of the government, but we also apply this 
analysis to central government expenditure on social services and welfare. This kind of 
expenditure is more universal than other functions of government outlays, and can be less 
targeted to specific constituency interests. Therefore we expect that the effect of legislature 
size would be less relevant in this case.   
  
                                                 
4 These results are also compounded by Matsusaka (1995) who finds that spending is considerably lower in 
states in which voters can initiate and approve laws by popular vote with respect to states in which these 
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Bicameralism 
Bicameral legislatures have received a consistent support from political economists as a tool 
to reduce the common pool-problem. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that the most 
salient feature of this system is the difference in constituencies’ preferences on policies with 
a partially overlapping between the preferences (interests) of the two chambers. In fact, two 
houses with the same constituencies would work as a unicameral system (Stigler, 1976 and 
Hayek, 1979).5 Persson et al. (1997) exploit the circumstance that in a bicameral system 
each house has a veto power over the other to formalize the outcome of this system as a 
bilateral monopoly over legislative power. Any legislative trade to which both chambers 
agree must result from a dual consent. The unanimity brings about a limitation in the 
budgetary outcomes. The mutual agreement by veto constitutes a clear difference with 
respect to the logrolling between a number of legislators within a single chamber. 
 Riker (1992) consider another channel that enables bicameralism to tame spending: it 
reduces the feasible set of policy outcomes, which promotes legislative stability. If 
preferences are unstable and this leads to frequent turnovers, any majority coalition will try 
to extract more benefits from government spending that those that it will seek if it had to 
continue to stay in power. Bicameralism reduces the passage of non-Codorcet winners on 
multidimensional issues, while allowing majority agreement on single-dimensional issues.6 
                                                                                                                                                      
initiatives are not allowed. Therefore, citizens would appear to prefer a smaller scope of the government with 
respect to politicians. 
5 Diermeier and Myerson (1999) provide a framework to rank legislature structures according to the incentives 
to centralize decision powers in systems with sequential chambers and a president with veto power.  
6 Dixit et al. (2000) argue that a bicameral system is better than a unicameral system operating under 
supermajority rule.  
 8
    An important feature of bicameralism is asymmetry between chambers: typically the 
lower house has the power to solve disagreement between them, or to initiate the legislative 
procedure on some issues. Moreover, they typically differ for the size and sometimes the 
upper house has an explicit territorial base. We can notice that the different size and 
composition of the houses brings about differences in the median voters preferences over 
policies. The more different are the constituencies, the further will be the median voters of 
each house, and therefore more difficult will be the agreement on policies.7 
Usually, empirical evidence does not explicitly take into account bicameralism: the 
tendency in the works surveyed earlier is to treat each chamber separately, as if there were 
no inter-relation between them, and asymmetries are not taken into account. Thornton and 
Ulrich (1999) find a strong negative effect of bicameralism on government expenditure in a 
panel of US states. Bradbury and Crain (2001) uncover a positive effect of legislature size 
on government spending much stronger in unicameral countries than in bicameral ones. 
Finally, Bradbury and Crain (2002) consider a panel of US states and find a significantly 
negative effect of bicameralism government spending in general and in several functional 
components such as public welfare expenditure, education expenditure, and highway 
expenditure. They use four measures of bicameralism on the basis of proxies for each 
chamber.8     
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive analysis of bicameralism, see Tsebelis and Money (1997). 
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III. Methodology and variables 
The model 
We estimate the following general relationship: 
 
Xi = α0 + α1LEG +  α2POL + α3EC +  ui,           (1) 
 
where X is the fiscal variable of interest (either central government expenditure or social and 
welfare expenditure), LEG is a vector of variables that in the case of legislature size includes 
the size of the lower and the upper houses and the senate over house ratio. POL is a vector 
describing the institutional features of a country, EC is a vector of economic and 
demographic variables, and u is the error term. All government expenditure variables are 
expressed in percentage of GDP or in per-capita terms. We use a measure of the size of 
government as government expenditure and social and welfare expenditure as dependent 
variables because the former is less constituency-specific in nature, therefore we expect a 
smaller effect of legislature size. 
   The basic database is taken from Persson and Tabellini (2003). However, for the 
cross-section database, because of data availability and the application of a stricter concept 
of democracy (a Gastil Index lower than 4.5), the database reduced to 75 countries. Data on 
legislature size are taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union (various years), averaging figures 
from 1990 to 1998 in analogy with the other data provided by Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
A detailed description of the dataset is given in an appendix at the end of the paper.  
                                                                                                                                                      
8 These measures include: average household income, the percentage of constituents with income greater than 
$50,000, the percentage of constituents receiving Social Security benefits, and the percentage of constituents 
employed in the manufacturing sector. 
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Legislature variables 
The size of legislatures enters in our analysis in three ways. With the variable LEG we sum 
up the number of seats of the lower and the upper houses, the latter may yield a number 
equal to zero if the system is unicameral. According to the theory, there is no expected sign 
on this variable. With the variables HSIZE and SSIZE, we indicate the number of legislators 
in each chamber, under the expectation of a positive sign, according to the so-called “Law of 
1/n”. We face the problem of fully appointed upper house. On the one hand, the capture of 
these members of the parliament from interest groups is not an issue here because they do 
not seek election and therefore votes from them. On the other hand, still a fully appointed 
house belong to a bicameral system, and the double veto argument applies. Nonetheless, the 
two chambers may have radically different median voters, and the previous discussion on 
bicameralism may still hold. Therefore, we have constructed two databases: the first is called 
“broad” and includes all the countries for which we have data, the second (“narrow”), 
excludes eight countries in which the upper house is fully appointed.9     
 Bicameralism plays an important role in the legislature size theory and in 
determining the costs structure for lobbies. By the variable S/H we measure the size of the 
upper house relative to the size of the lower house. From this definition we can obtain 
different degrees of bicameralism.10 The degree of bicameralism affects the production cost 
of legislation in two ways: by altering the similarity between the bases of representation in 
                                                 
9 These countries are: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Fiji, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and United 
Kingdom. 
10 Perfect bicameralism would imply two houses of the same sizes. A low degree of bicameralism entails two 
chambers of radically different sizes and possibly different bases of representation (e.g., one elected on the 
basis of population, and the other on the basis of geographic/administrative delimitation). 
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the two chambers, and by altering the labor specialization within each chamber. For a given 
polity size (i.e., a given sum of house plus senate legislators), an increase in the relative size 
of one chamber alters the representation within each assembly, tending to reduce the 
homogeneity of the constituency between the two respective bases. For example, if the 
degree of bicameralism shrinks, the majority needed for each senator to be re-elected has 
broadened to encompass other minority interests. By the same token, the number of 
constituents per legislator in the lower house has been reduced, having the reverse effect of 
increasing the homogeneity of the interests within each constituency. As the level of 
bicameralism decreases, the disparity between the respective bases of representation 
increases, raising decision-making costs. Therefore, finding a viable majority in both houses 
becomes more expensive for interest-groups. Bicameralism also affects the specialization of 
work in committees and house(s). Legislators in smaller houses carry a higher per-man 
workload than representatives in larger houses, and this is especially reflected in the work in 
committees, which can be modified by changing the size and the number of these bodies. 
Higher degrees of bicameralism lower the net cost of decision making, and have a positive 
effect on legislative output, given the assumption of diminishing returns.  
 Table 1 reports the average number of seats for each chamber for each country in the 
considered period. It shows that although countries have different size in terms of population 
and land area, the dispersion of the size of their parliaments is definitely lower.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 
 12
Control variables 
Countries considered in this paper differ from several institutional features, an issue that we 
have to contemplate doing a cross-country comparative analysis. We highlight the role of 
two characteristics that can be controlled for. The first one is related with the presidential or 
parliamentarian nature of the political system. Recent studies in comparative politics 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1999) show that presidential systems are more accountable and tend 
to reduce government spending. Presidential systems are centred on a directly elected 
president that has formal power on the government and even veto power on parliamentary 
decisions. In contrast, parliamentary systems rely on bargaining between parties, with the 
related delays in stabilization policies and capture from interest groups. The variable PRES is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one for the presidential form of government and zero for 
parliamentary ones. Voting rules also greatly differ among political systems. With the 
dummy variable MAJ that is equal to one for plurality systems and zero otherwise we 
capture this difference. Our prior on both variables is that both negatively affect government 
spending. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) show that voters anticipating government 
policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives 
more prone to higher total primary spending in proportional (majoritarian) system when the 
share of transfer spending is high (low). In Austin-Smith (2000) under the assumption of a 
smaller number of parties represented under plurality than proportional representation (PR), 
plurality leads to single-handed policy decisions, while more parties form coalitions under 
PR. The interaction among elections, redistributive taxation, and endogenous formation of 
economic groups produces larger government expenditure under PR than under plurality. 
Persson et al. (1997) argue that concentration of power in parliamentary regimes make it 
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easier for politicians to collude, and in equilibrium this implies higher taxes than in 
presidential regimes.  
We also control for the Wagner Law, the relationship that maintains that government 
spending tends to increase as income grows, using log of per-capita GDP (LYP). Log of 
population (LPOP) enters in our regressions to take into account three effects. First, a large 
population increases the marginal benefit of spending if population density creates unique 
public good problems. Second, large populations may present opportunity for economies of 
scale in the production of government services. Third, the logrolling theory we are going to 
test relies on the idea that representatives can target spending to specific subsets of 
population, and holding constant the number of districts, this should be more difficult with a 
small population rather than with a large population. Fourth, we consider the degree of 
openness to international trade (measured via the variable OPEN as sum of import and 
export over GDP), since a certain literature maintains that countries that are more open to 
trade are more exposed to external shocks, and therefore seek insurance through a larger 
government sector (Rodrik, 1998). Fifth, we control for the proportion of the elderly in the 
population, since especially in developed countries, a large amount of government spending 
is devoted to pensions and healthcare expenditure for the elderly. Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics for the variables involved in the analysis (broad cross-section).11 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The correlation matrix is available upon request from the author. 
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IV. Empirical results 
In obtaining and presenting the estimates we carry on the following procedure. First, we 
estimate a general model and then reduce the economic variables to those who are significant 
(while always keeping the other institutional variables). Second, we start from this reduced 
specification and separate the estimates for SSIZE, HSIZE and S/H to address possible 
multicollinearity. In particular, we first estimate SSIZE and S/H together, then SSIZE only, 
always with the controls. Finally we estimate a model with HSIZE and S/H.12 Because most 
of the previous empirical evidence has been obtained in per-capita terms, we present our 
results both as a percentage of GDP and in per-capita terms. As motivated earlier, we use 
two different databases: broad (estimates 1-5) and narrow (6-10), depending on the elective 
nature of the upper house. 
 Results for legislature size and government spending as percentage of GDP (Table 3) 
show that the size of both chambers does not have a significant effect on government 
spending, with two exceptions for SSIZE, which has the expected positive sign. The same is 
true for bicameralism, which has the expected negative sign, but is significant in two out of 
eight estimations. Among other variables, openness and the proportion of the elderly have 
the expected positive effect, whilst population (in the broad sample) and per-capita income 
are not significant in the general estimates. The two institutional variables have a different 
behaviour: presidentialism leads to a reduction in government spending as predicted by the 
theory, whilst a majoritarian voting system has the expected negative sign but is usually 
insignificant. The regressions explain a fair amount of the variability of the relationship, and 
the F statistics are highly significant. 
                                                 
12 We do not report the estimations for the HSIZE alone. They are very similar to those with HSIZE and 
bicameralism, and are available upon request from the author. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
These results are confirmed when we turn to the specification in per-capita terms 
(Table 4). The only notable exception, as far as legislature size is concerned, is that only in 
the narrow sample HSIZE is sometimes significant, whilst S/H is insignificant and quite 
unstable as long as its sign and magnitude are concerned. SSIZE is typically insignificant. 
Among control variables, the picture is quite different: institutional variables are 
significantly negative across all the estimates Economic variables are usually insignificant, 
with the exception of LYP, which points towards government spending being a normal good. 
The adjusted R2 is higher than in the previous set of estimates, and the F statistics are 
significant.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 Turning to social and welfare expenditure, we first note that we have a smaller 
number of observations, since for some countries data for this variable is not available. 
Results for the relationship between legislature size and welfare spending (Fig. 5) do not 
change the evidence previously uncovered. In the broad sample the size of the two houses is 
never significant (only in column 5 HSIZE is borderline insignificant. The same applies to 
S/H, which has a large significant effect in one estimation only. One should note that the size 
of some variables is strongly reduced when one of the houses is dropped from the 
independent variables. This happens to S/H, MAJ and PRES. In the former it brings this 
variable to loose significance. The demographic variable is not affected by this, whereas 
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OPEN is still significant (though at a lower level) and its point estimates are marginally 
affected. The explicative power of the estimates is reduced somehow with respect to general 
government spending, yet is quite high. The F statistic is always highly significant. The 
narrow sample shows a rather similar picture for all the variables of interest, both economic 
and institutional. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In per-capita terms (Fig. 6), results are quite similar for the all variables of interest.     
Compared with estimates as percentage of GDP, population enters significantly in all the 
regressions, whilst OPEN is significant only in the narrow sample. In turn, PRES is always 
significant. The goodness of fit is substantially lower, whereas the F statistic is always 
highly significant. Once again the narrow sample confirms the results of the broad sample. 
The only notable exception concerns the significance of the trade variable, though the 
estimated coefficients are negative.  
  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we have extended empirical analysis of legislature size and bicameralism to 
cross-section of countries, conditioning for economic and especially institutional variables. 
First, we find evidence that the number of legislators has an indefinite effect on government 
and welfare spending as predicted by the theory. In particular, we can rarely distinguish 
between the effects of the two chambers, which are typically insignificant. Second, 
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bicameralism - measured as the ratio in legislature size between the two chambers to capture 
the difference in their constituencies - does not have an effect on government and welfare 
spending. Third, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion in the sample of countries that 
have a non-elective upper house. These results reinforce previous findings concerning the 
US on the effect of legislature size, which were not confirmed in an international study. To 
conduct this analysis across countries, we introduce a number of control variables to take 
into account their different institutional features. Results for these variables are usually 
consistent across estimations and substantially similar to those found in previous studies, 
with the exception of majoritarian electoral rules.  
 
 
Data appendix 
Central government spending as a percentage of GDP (CGEXP) and per-capita (CGEXPPC), 
central government expenditure consolidated in social services and welfare spending as a 
percentage of GDP (SSW) and per-capita (SSWPC), log of population (LPOP), log of per-
capita GDP (LYP), openness - defined as the sum of import and export over GDP (OPEN), 
percentage of the population aged 65 and more (PROP65), majoritarian voting rule (MAJ) 
and presidential system (PRES) are taken from Persson and Tabellini (2003). The size of 
each chamber (HSIZE and SSIZE), from which we compute the senate/house ratio (S/H), are 
taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union (various years).  
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Table 1 –Upper and lower house sizes.  
Country Upper  
house size 
Lower 
house size
Country Upper 
house size 
Lower 
house size
Argentina 48 257 Japan 252 511
Australia 76 147 Latvia - 100
Austria 62 183 Luxembourg - 60
Bahamas 16 49 Malawi - 165
Bangladesh - 330 Malta - 65
Barbados 21 28 Mauritius - 70
Belgium 127 181 Mexico 93 500
Belize 10 29 Namibia - 72
Bolivia 27 130 Nepal 60 205
Botswana - 40 Netherlands 75 150
Brazil 81 510 New Zealand - 96
Bulgaria - 240 Nicaragua - 92
Canada 104 295 Norway - 165
Chile 46 120 Pakistan 87 217
Colombia 102 166 Papua N. Guinea - 109
Costa Rica - 57 Paraguay 45 80
Cyprus - 56 Peru - 100
Czech Republic 81 200 Philippines 24 250
Denmark - 179 Poland 100 460
Dominican Rep. 30 120 Portugal - 230
Ecuador - 67 Romania 140 350
El Salvador - 84 Russia 176 449
Estonia - 101 Slovak Republic - 140
Fiji 34 70 South Africa 90 400
Finland - 200 Spain 254 350
France 321 577 Sri Lanka - 225
Gambia - 51 St. Vincent and G. - 21
Germany 68 668 Sweden - 349
Ghana - 200 Switzerland 46 200
Greece - 300 Thailand 270 370
Guatemala - 95 Trinidad and T. 31 37
Honduras - 128 Turkey - 450
Hungary - 386 United Kingdom 1200 651
Iceland - 63 USA 100 440
India 245 498 Uruguay 30 99
Ireland 60 160 Venezuela 50 203
Israel - 120 Zambia - 150
Italy 326 630   
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics, broad sample. 
  Mean St. dev. Min Max 
CGEXP Central government 
spending (% GDP) 
29.414 10.452 9.743 51.178
CGEXPPC Central government 
spending (per capita) 
2303.801 2189.83 136.596 7553.840
HSIZE House size 217.280 166.310 21.000 668.000
LYP Log of per-capita GDP 8.586 0.906 6.273 9.942
MAJ Majoritarian 0.347 0.476 0 1
OPEN Openness  73.963 36.639 17.562 190.470
LPOP Log of population (000s) 2.191 1.833 -2.205 6.812
PRES Presidential system 0.387 0.487 0 1
PROP65 Population aged > 65 (%) 8.718 4.900 2.260 17.430
S/H Senate/house size 0.226 0.304 0.000 1.843
SSIZE Senate size 66.773 153.420 0.000 1200.000
SSW Central social and welfare 
spending (% GDP) 
8.571 6.674 0.129 22.385
SSWPC Central social and welfare 
spending (per capita) 
889.989 1027.315 2.083 4009.235
 
 
Table 3 - Legislature size and government spending (as percentage of GDP). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C 
 
8.796 
(11.653) 
15.785 
(11.210) 
24.511†     
(10.381) 
27.292‡     
(10.343) 
23.009†     
(11.056) 
19.6430*    
(11.606) 
18.685‡    
(4.840) 
20.241‡     
(3.873) 
20.015‡     
(3.927) 
16.734‡     
(4.551) 
SSIZE 
 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.014   
(0.009) 
0.003   
(0.006) 
 0.030   
(0.026) 
0.030   
(0.026) 
0.039*  
(0.021) 
0.0127    
(0.014)    
 
HSIZE 
 
0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
  0.007   
(0.007) 
0.005  
(0.009) 
0.005  
(0.009) 
  0.012  
(0.007) 
S/H 
 
-7.612 
(5.354) 
-8.439* 
(4.663) 
-7.148      
(4.556) 
 -2.474      
(2.956) 
-9.052      
(7.372) 
-9.104      
(7.286) 
-10.829*     
(6.510) 
 -2.241      
(4.256) 
LPOP 
 
-0.933 
(1.074) 
    -0.016*  
 (0.008) 
-0.016*  
(0.008) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.013   
(0.008) 
-0.016*   
(0.008) 
LYP 
 
2.287* 
(1.174) 
-0.365 
(1.318) 
   -0.131       
(1.439) 
    
OPEN 
 
0.077† 
(0.037) 
0.095‡ 
(0.029) 
0.079‡  
(0.023) 
0.076‡  
(0.023) 
0.089‡  
(0.029) 
0.087‡ 
(0.030) 
0.087‡ 
(0.029) 
0.079‡   
(0.025) 
0.076‡   
(0.026) 
0.092‡    
(0.029) 
MAJ 
 
-5.136† 
(2.008) 
2.869 
(2.974) 
-2.528      
(1.928) 
-2.887      
(1.935) 
-2.191      
(1.943) 
-1.426      
(2.161) 
-1.422      
(2.141) 
-1.639      
(2.091) 
-1.500      
(2.120) 
-0.927      
(2.104) 
PRES 
 
-7.901‡ 
(2.342) 
-4.303* 
(2.207) 
-6.008‡      
(2.090) 
-5.938‡      
(2.111) 
-5.541†      
(2.154) 
-6.472‡      
(2.263) 
-6.462‡      
(2.241) 
-6.662‡      
(2.197) 
-7.127‡      
(2.211) 
-6.405‡      
(2.247) 
PROP65 
 
1.111‡ 
(0.268) 
1.108‡ 
(0.280) 
1.121‡    
(0.283) 
1.187‡    
(0.282) 
1.156‡    
(0.287) 
0.865‡ 
(0.323) 
0.846‡  
(0.241) 
0.865‡    
(0.238) 
0.866‡    
(0.241)  
0.871‡    
(0.241) 
Sample 
 
Broad Broad Broad Broad Broad Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow 
Adj-R2 0.554 0.660 0.631 0.617   0.625 0.664 0.664 0.663 0.647 0.656 
Obs. 75 75 75 75 75 67 67 67 67 67 
F 10.26‡ 14.02‡ 16.39‡ 18.32‡ 15.88‡ 12.54‡ 14.35‡ 16.56‡ 18.32‡ 16.12 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, †, and ‡ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Legislature size and government spending (in per capita terms). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C 
 
15.504‡      
(1.353) 
15.148‡      
(1.264) 
-14.731‡     
(1.218)  
-14.679‡     
(1.201) 
-14.943‡     
(1.259)  
14.720‡     
(1.429) 
14.571‡      
(1.258) 
-14.888‡     
(1.204) 
-14.877‡     
(1.193) 
-15.008‡     
(1.173) 
SSIZE 
 
-0.0015   
(0.0014) 
-0.0017    
(0.0014) 
-0.0008     
(0.0011) 
-0.0011*    
(0.0007) 
 -0.0036   
(0.0032) 
-0.309 
(0.318) 
0.0011     
(0.0023) 
0.0009     
(0.0014) 
 
HSIZE 
 
0.0004     
(0.0014) 
0.00117  
(0.0009) 
  0.0005    
(0.0008) 
0.00117   
(0.00118) 
0.0021†   
(0.0009) 
  0.0013* 
(0.0007) 
S/H 
 
-0.991      
(0.621) 
0.729    
(0.603) 
-0.200      
(0.578) 
 -0.591      
(0.376) 
0.583   
(0.908) 
0.714 
(0.892) 
-0.133      
(0.825) 
 -0.126      
(51.691) 
LPOP 
 
0.094 
(0.125) 
    0.001   
(0.001) 
    
LYP 
 
2.016‡      
(0.136) 
1.988‡      
(0.131) 
1.998‡    
(0.131) 
1.991‡    
(0.128) 
1.995‡    
(0.131) 
1.929‡    
(0.174) 
1.913‡      
(0.131) 
1.930‡    
(0.135) 
1.928‡    
(0.133) 
1.914‡      
(0.131) 
OPEN 
 
-0.0031   
 (0.0042) 
    -0.004   
(0.004) 
    
MAJ 
 
-0.826‡      
(0.233) 
-0.826‡      
(0.232) 
1.178‡      
(0.229) 
1.163‡     
(0.223) 
1.202‡     
(0.232) 
-0.695‡      
(0.266) 
-0.799‡    
(0.244) 
1.131‡     
(0.249) 
1.133‡     
(0.247) 
1.144‡     
(0.206) 
PRES 
 
-0.793‡    
(0.272) 
-0.742‡      
(0.263) 
1.046‡     
(0.251) 
1.043‡     
(0.249) 
1.109‡     
(0.263) 
-0.728‡      
(0.278) 
-0.842‡      
(0.237) 
1.222‡     
(0.244) 
1.216‡     
(0.238) 
1.265‡     
(0.237) 
PROP65
 
-0.032      
(0.036) 
    0.002  
(0.039) 
    
Sample 
 
Broad Broad Broad Broad Broad Narrow 
 
Narrow 
 
Narrow Narrow Narrow 
 
Adj-R2 0.802 0.801 0.796 0.796 0.796 0.811  0.803 0.787 0.787 0.799 
Obs. 75 75 75 75 75 67 67 67 67 67 
F 33.51‡ 38.46‡ 44.38‡ 53.92‡ 44.21‡ 27.26‡ 40.77‡ 45.27‡ 57.48‡ 48.4‡ 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, †, and ‡ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 – Legislature size and welfare spending (as percentage of GDP). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C 
 
25.148†     
(10.991) 
17.862‡     
(4.634) 
-3.041      
(2.040) 
-3.074   
(1.988) 
-4.334*     
(2.252) 
-14.381†     
(6.463) 
-5.385*      
(2.835) 
-2.704      
(2.190) 
-2.697      
(2.167) 
-4.169      
(2.513) 
SSIZE 
 
0.012    
(0.011) 
0.013    
(0.010) 
0.002   
(0.005) 
0.001   
(0.003) 
 -0.002    
(0.013) 
0.003  
(0.014) 
0.007    
(0.010) 
0.008   
(0.006) 
 
HSIZE 
 
0.007  
(0.008) 
0.002  
(0.008) 
  0.004  
(0.003) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.010  
(0.006) 
  0.004   
(0.004) 
S/H 
 
-6.433      
(4.735) 
-7.395*      
(4.151) 
-0.209      
(2.389) 
 -0.151      
(1.439) 
1.970      
(3.806) 
2.329 
(3.853) 
0.228      
(3.399) 
 1.697      
(2.194) 
LPOP 
 
-0.012   
(0.008) 
    -0.027*    
(0.015) 
-0.022   
(0.015) 
   
LYP 
 
-0.955      
(1.343) 
    1.216     
(0.788) 
    
OPEN 
 
0.079‡    
(0.029) 
0.084‡    
(0.029) 
0.028*   
(0.013) 
0.028*   
(0.012) 
0.027*   
(0.015) 
0.035†    
(0.015) 
0.033†   
(0.016) 
0.024*    
(0.013) 
0.024*    
(0.013) 
0.032†    
(0.016) 
MAJ 
 
-2.036      
(1.961) 
-2.497      
(1.943) 
-1.683*      
(1.043) 
-1.484      
(1.034) 
-1.414      
(1.016) 
-0.624      
(1.252) 
-0.622      
(1.270) 
-1.532      
(1.174) 
-1.540      
(1.156) 
-1.336      
(1.142) 
PRES 
 
-6.035‡      
(2.153) 
-5.731‡      
(2.142) 
-0.019      
(1.105) 
-0.014      
(1.094) 
0.147      
(1.099) 
0.627      
(1.299) 
0.404 
(1.309) 
-0.489      
(1.217) 
-0.479      
(1.196) 
-0.327      
(1.218) 
PROP65 
 
1.078‡     
(0.287) 
1.001‡     
(0.219) 
1.144‡    
(0.117) 
1.145‡    
(0.116) 
1.116‡    
(0.116) 
0.877‡   
(0.178) 
1.061‡ 
(0.134) 
1.055‡     
(0.135) 
1.0551‡     
(0.133) 
1.044     
(0.133) 
Sample 
 
Broad Broad Broad Broad Broad Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow Narrow 
Adj-R2 0.643 0.629 0.785 0.785 0.789    0.796      0.786     0.772 0.773 0.776 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 58 58 58 58 58 
F 13.01‡ 16.28‡ 35.32‡ 43.1‡ 36.25‡ 20.88‡ 22.55‡ 28.9‡ 35.36‡ 29.53 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, †, and ‡ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 – Legislature size and welfare spending (in per-capita terms). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
C 
 
19.308*     
(9.164) 
71.717‡     
(17.203) 
56.982‡      
(13.838) 
57.549‡      
(1.344) 
68.425 ‡   
(15.057) 
55.552      
(36.167) 
66.754‡     
(15.504) 
56.460‡      
(12.218) 
56.395‡    
(12.082) 
59.669‡      
(14.157) 
SSIZE 
 
0.022      
(0.038) 
0.015      
(0.038) 
-0.014      
(0.032) 
-0.008      
(0.018) 
 -0.013      
(0.076) 
-0.014      
(0.075) 
-0.033      
(0.579) 
-0.038      
(0.037) 
 
HSIZE 
 
-0.041      
(0.034) 
-0.049      
(0.034) 
  -0.042      
(0.028) 
-0.044      
(0.034) 
-0.045      
(0.033) 
  -0.096      
(0.021) 
S/H 
 
-0.008      
(0.002) 
-3.822      
(16.550) 
3.237      
(15.927) 
 1.630      
(9.570) 
-6.683      
(21.305) 
-6.236      
(21.067)  
-2.169      
(1.987) 
 -9.713      
(12.357) 
LPOP 
 
0.0153*     
(0.084) 
0.181*    
(0.093) 
0.096      
(0.072) 
0.094      
(0.071) 
0.172*     
(0.090) 
0.178†     
(0.084) 
0.185†  
(0.081) 
0.181†     
(0.086) 
0.191†  
(0.091) 
0.197†  
(0.096) 
LYP 
 
7.037      
(0.047) 
    1.515      
(4.407) 
    
OPEN 
 
-0.146      
(0.099) 
    -0.181†      
(0.088) 
-0.183‡     
(0.087) 
-0.174†      
(0.074) 
-0.175†    
(0.073) 
-0.185†      
(0.088) 
MAJ 
 
1.619      
(7.306) 
2.365      
(7.366) 
5.676      
(7.048) 
5.722      
(6.986) 
3.199      
(7.020) 
-0.617      
(7.005) 
-0.614      
(6.942) 
5.225      
(6.546) 
5.301    
(6.450) 
4.414     
(6.431)  
PRES 
 
-2.164‡      
(0.797) 
-2.367‡     
(0.793)  
-1.956‡      
(0.745) 
-1.962‡      
(0.738) 
-2.294‡     
(0.767) 
-1.887‡     
(0.726)    
-1.915‡    
(0.715) 
-1.300*      
(0.678) 
-1.310*      
(0.667) 
-1.323*     
(0.686) 
PROP65
 
3.959‡      
(0.010) 
2.964‡     
(0.780) 
3.067‡     
(0.783) 
3.081‡      
(0.774) 
2.914‡      
(0.765) 
2.567‡     
(0.994) 
2.338‡    
(0.732) 
2.224‡      
(0.751) 
2.221‡      
(0.744) 
2.255‡    
(0.747) 
Sample 
 
Broad Broad Broad Broad Broad Narrow 
 
Narrow 
 
Narrow Narrow Narrow 
 
Adj-R2 0.406 0.382 0.361 0.360 0.381   0.392    0.391 0.326 0.325 0.324 
Obs. 65 65 65 65 65 58 58 58 58 58 
F 4.18‡ 4.34‡ 4.593‡ 5.442‡ 5.013‡ 3.446‡ 3.933‡ 4.105‡ 5.018‡ 4.075‡ 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, †, and ‡ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed on the 13th June 2004 at Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of 
London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom 
 
